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EFFLUENT FEES IN WATER QUALITY 
MANAGEMENT: THE VERMONT 
WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT 
By Nicholas P. Moros-:-
1. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Vermont recently enacted1 a Water Pollution 
Control Act2 which is unique in American legislation and prob-
ably one of the most effective anti-pollution measures yet intro-
duced in the United States. The statute's uniqueness and strength 
derive from the fact that it combines a discharge permit system 
and an effluent fee system. The concept of a permit system is not 
new in theory or application to environmental control;3 neither 
is the theory of an effluent fee system new, although in actual 
practice the system has had little significance in the United 
States.' Vermont, however, is the first government in this country 
to join the two systems in a single water quality management 
program. 
The general purpose of the Vermont statute is to raise the 
quality of the state's waters.5 The provisions for discharge per-
mits, temporary pollution permits, effluent fees, and penalties 
are all directed toward this goal. As between the discharge permit 
system and the effluent fee system, the effluent fee should con-
tribute more to the improvement of water quality. It is this sys-
tem which will be analyzed below. 
The specific purpose of the effluent fee provision is to provide 
an economic incentive for polluters to reduce the volume and 
noxiousness of their discharges.6 In order to fully understand the 
operation of the statute, this purpose, as well as the statute's 
general purpose, must be borne in mind. Because of the nature 
of the purposes, the Water Resources Board, which administers 
631 
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the Act, is limited in the approaches it may lawfully take with 
respect to pollution. 
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT 
The Act gives the Water Resources Board the authority to set 
classifications A through D for the state's various watercourses. 7 
Class A waters refer to those which are of reservoir quality, and 
class D waters refer to those which treat industrial waste within 
certain restricted zones. The Board has also been given authority 
to set water quality standards and permissible effluent levels for 
each of the four main classifications. These guidelines specifically 
set forth maximum permissible levels regarding such matters as 
pH, color and turbidity, temperature increase, and chemical 
compounds. 8 Under the current Water Quality Standards, the 
Board has decided that all wastes being discharged into the 
state's waters must undergo secondary treatment. 9 It should be 
noted that it is highly possible that the Board will revise and 
upgrade the present water quality standards. At the very least, 
the standards will probably be expanded to cover certain wastes 
for which no maximum levels exist at the present time.Io 
Persons who expect to discharge wastes into the state's waters 
are required to file discharge reports with the Department of 
Water Resources.u These reports must set forth the location, 
nature, volume and frequency of the expected discharges. Pre-
sumably these data will be used by the Board in updating water 
quality standards. After filing a discharge report, a person applies 
to the Department for a discharge permit.12 The permit must be 
gran ted by the Departmen t if it finds that the proposed discharge 
will not reduce the quality of the receiving waters below the 
classification established for them.13 In other words, if the appli-
cant has complied with the water quality standards, regarding 
such matters as secondary treatment and acceptable levels of 
various chemicals, he will be granted a permit; otherwise no 
permit will be accorded himY For the purposes of this article, 
those persons who are granted discharge permits will be referred 
to as "dischargers" and those who are denied discharge permits 
will be referred to as "polluters." 
If denied a discharge permit, the applicant may file for a 
temporary pollution permit. l5 A temporary pollution permit will 
not, however, automatically be granted. The Department must 
EFFLUENT FEES 633 
be satisfied that the polluter is installing, or making a good faith 
effort to install, treatment facilities. 16 The polluter who is refused 
a temporary pollution permit has the option to close down his 
operations, or to payout penalties which can run $10,000 per 
day and/or to incur the risk of being imprisoned five years for 
each violationY As a condition of retaining a temporary pollu-
tion permit, the polluter must pay periodic effluent fees in ac-
cordance with rates established by the BoardY As mentioned 
above, the effluent fee provides an economic incentive for the 
polluter to install the required abatement facilities. 19 
In terms of enforcement, the law is relatively strong. It con-
tains provisions for action by the attorney general,2° for imposi-
tion of penalties,21 and for implementation of traditional common 
law remedies to compensate injured parties.22 Moreover, the 
effluent fee provision itself functions as an enforcement device. 
III. VARIOUS OBJECTIVES OF AN EFFLUENT FEE SYSTEM 
In analyzing the statute, one must recognize a fundamental 
distinction. The term effluent fee "system" refers to the imposi-
tion of an effluent fee. In contrast, effluent fee "method" refers to 
one of many means of determining the fee to be imposed. The 
Vermont statute itself calls for an effluent fee "system;"23 how-
ever, since the statute also requires that the system operate as 
an "economic incentive," the Board is accordingly limited in its 
formulation of a particular fee "method." 
An effluent fee system may have any of five objectives:24 (1) 
determining whether fees do in fact lead to improvement in 
water quality, and if so to what extent;25 (2) establishing desir-
able levels of water quality;26 (3) achieving pre-determined levels 
of water quality;27 (4) covering costs of improvement measures;28 
and (5) motivating compliance with prescribed waste disposal 
behavior, methods, or standards. The last mentioned objective, 
of course, is the one attended to in Vermont. It is to be distin-
guished from the second and third mentioned objectives. The 
Water Resources Board has already determined desirable levels 
of water quality through its system of classification, and these 
levels are achieved by means of the water quality standards and 
the discharge permit. They are not achieved by means of the 
fee system. 
As mentioned above, the fee system functions also as an en-
forcement device. In this respect, it is considerably more efficient 
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than litigation. The fee system permits the Water Resources 
Department to free itself of the enormous time and manpower 
commitments required by court actions. The system is a simple, 
self-operating process which does not require an order by the 
court and which when implemented, cannot be stayed by an 
appeal to the court.28 
IV. DIFFERENT EFFLUENT FEE METHODS ApPLICABLE 
TO THE INCENTIVE OBJECTIVE 
As respects the incentive objective, fees may be determined 
through any number of methods, each of which differs in effec-
tiveness. Possible methods include a uniform fee, a uniform fee 
weighted by zones, a fee based on downstream damages, a fee 
based on cost of treatment, a fee based upon dilution factors, 
and a combination of these. This article will be limited to an 
examination of the two most significant approaches: the cost-of-
treatment method and the downstream-damages method. 
There are fundamental points which must be kept in mind 
while examining the two methods. First, one must recall that the 
purpose of the effluent fee is to motivate compliance with the 
prescribed water quality standards and watercourse classifica-
tions. Second, in determining a fee method, one must weigh two 
unsatisfactory possibilities. On the one hand, some polluters may, 
for reaons of economy, pay the fee rather than install treatment 
facilities. On the other hand, a fee may be excessively harsh for 
those polluters who cannot readily obtain or install treatment 
facili ties. 
This section of the article compares generally the cost-of-
treatment method and the downstream-damages method and 
then analyzes specifically the characteristics of and precedents 
for the two methods. Section V will evaluate the two alternatives 
in terms of constitutionality, equity, incentive effects, ad-
ministrative feasibility, and relation to downstream damages.29 
A. General Comparison 
The fee method that is based on cost of treatment sets a fee 
which is equal to, or preferably somewhat higher than, the cost of 
constructing and maintaining proper treatment facilities. The fee 
method that is based on downstream damages reflects the im-
pairment of interests which other users have in the watercourse. 
The cost-of-treatment method is more directly related to the 
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purpose of motivating compliance with the water quality stan-
dards. If a polluter finds it economically more advantageous to 
install treatment facilities than to pay an effiuent fee, presumably 
he will choose to install the facilities. The cost-of-treatment 
method removes the natural tendency to delay. The downstream-
damages method, on the other hand, has no direct relation to the 
cost of treating wastes, and consequently is not likely to be a 
motivating force unless the damages do, by chance, prove to be 
greater than the cost of treatment.3D 
There seems to be a logical inconsistency in the statute: 
§912(e) (1) states that the primary purpose of the fee is to pro-
vide an economic incentive while §912(e) (2) makes it mandatory 
for the Board, in setting the fee rates, to approximate the down-
stream damages. If downstream damages are less than the cost of 
treatment, the effiuent charges provision is emasculated as an 
incentive force. For the effiuent fee system to operate at an 
optimum level, it is imperative that treatment costs be taken into 
account in setting the fee rates. 
B. The Cost-oj-Treatment Method 
The characteristics of the cost-of-treatment method are quite 
simple: once a specific level of treatment is deemed necessary, the 
Department computes a fee greater than the annual cost of such 
treatment in order to provide an incentive to comply with the 
required standard. There are three ways of setting the treatment 
standard and corresponding fees: a uniform treatment standard 
for all effiuents (e.g., secondary treatment),31 a uniform treat-
ment standard for all effiuents within certain zones of water 
(e.g., tertiary treatment in Class C waters, secondary treatment 
in Class D waters), or a specific treatment for each effiuent. The 
last of the three would yield the best results, but it would be all 
but impossible to administer. While Vermont currently seems to 
favor the first alternative, it is conceivable that the Board might 
change to the second approach.32 
There are three significant precedents for a cost-of-treatment 
fee system. The one most similar to the Vermont system is the 
Czech program enacted in 1966. This system is also based on an 
incentive rationale, but the charges themselves are fixed after a 
consideration of two factors. The basic charge is derived from 
annual cost-of-treatment estimates; a surcharge is then imposed 
which reflects the degree to which a person caused degradation 
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of the water, i.e., downstream damage.33 The two other cost-of-
treatment precedents are the Rhur system and the several North 
American municipal sewage treatment programs. While neither 
of these precedents rests on an incentive rationale, they both 
compute fees which are based on cost of treatment. It would 
seem then that as a general propostion, the cost-of-treatment 
method is a fundamentally sound response to the problem of 
setting fees. 
The fee structure must reflect the nature of the treatment 
process required and the degree of water quality to be achieved. 
The fee can be based either on actual engineering designs and 
estimates submitted by individual polluters or on a standardized 
statistical table.34 The best results might emerge from setting the 
statistical figures relatively high and then permitting the polluter 
to choose either of the two methods. Such a scheme would give the 
polluter added incentive to produce a detailed engineering report 
and design, with documented costs estimates, for a conversion to 
the required treatment. 
The central problem to the cost-of-treatment method is that, 
inconsistent with a statutory requirement, it does not directly 
reflect downstream damages. It might be argued, however, that 
downstream damages have already been taken into account in 
the setting of water quality standards35 and that, therefore, a 
cost-of-treatment method indirectly reflects such damages. Yet 
even if such an argument is basically correct, the reflection could 
not be sufficiently accurate. In light of this fact, the provision 
calling for the approximation of downstream damages should be 
repealed or amended so as to permit the Board to reflect down-
stream damages to the degree that it deems appropriate. In the 
event that the section is not repealed or so amended, the Board 
might be wise to establish fee rates similar to those in the Czech 
structure, i.e., a basic charge based on cost of treatment with a 
downstream-damages surcharge. In this way, the fee would re-
flect downstream damages, as the statute requires, while still 
retaining its incentive effect-the primary purpose of the system. 
C. The Downstream Damage Method 
The rationale for the downstream-damages method is that 
since a polluter caused injury he should bear the cost of correc-
tion. The method presumes that impairment of water uses has 
a measurable economic value. This is by no means a universally 
accepted presumption.36 
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In terms of precedent, there is no system in operation which is 
based on downstream damages. There have, however, been pro-
posals for such effiuent charge methods, the most notable pro-
posal being that by the staff of ORSANCO (Ohio River Valley 
Water Sanitation Commission) in 1957. This study is somewhat 
limited in applicability, however, since it was of the highly in-
dustrialized Ohio River region where damages may be relatively 
easily measured. Damages in the Ohio River region can be accu-
rately determined by measurement of the water's saline content; 
this technique is not appropriate, however, for determining dam-
ages in recreational waters, such as Vermont's.37 
One problem, as mentioned above, with the downstream-
damages method is that it does not supply a clear economic incen-
tive to comply with water quality standards. A second problem 
with this method is that it is extremely difficult to gather data on 
downstream damages and to make meaningful valuations thereof. 
Without such data and valuations, the system cannot be effec-
tively administered. These problems are explored at length below. 
V. EXAMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE METHODS AGAINST THE 
CRITERIA OF CONSTITUTIONALITY, EQUITY, AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE FEASIBILITY 
It should be recognized that no fee system or fee method could 
perfectly meet each of the assessment criteria discussed in this 
section. The purposes of discussing these criteria is simply to re-
veal the major considerations which must precede a final deci-
sion on the method to be employed. In the final analysis, the 
Board and Department will have to consider all the criteria and, 
having done so, establish a set of priorities. From this process 
there hopefully will evolve an optimum fee structure. 
A. Constitutionality 
The first constitutional issue which must be faced is whether 
an effiuent fee system is so extensive an interference with private 
property interests as to constitute a deprivation of property 
without just compensation. Although the disposal of wastes into 
the state's waters has been held to be a right, the right is not 
absolute. It is limited to a "reasonable use."38 At present, how-
ever, it is not clear whether the courts would decide that the right 
to discharge wastes into the state's waters is a private property 
right. If it is not a private property right, the issue of unconsti-
tutional "taking" is, of course, moot since no "property" would 
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be taken. We shall presume for purposes of this analysis that 
such a right is indeed a property right. If, then, a court found 
that a water use permitted by the Board were a "reasonable use," 
the effluent fee provision would arguably be constitutional, since 
the fees are imposed only on "unreasonable" uses. It would seem 
that the fee provision would be a constitutional exercise of the 
state's power to regulate and not an unconstitutional taking 
under either the United States Constitution or the Vermont 
Constitution. 
It is extremely difficult to determine the precise point at which 
regulation ends and taking begins. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized the difficulty of drawing a line between the 
two,39 and there is no agreement among the various state courts. 
The test in New Hampshire, for example, is whether the benefit 
derived from the regulation outweighs the burden imposed 
thereby.40 This test, if followed in Vermont, would probably 
cause the courts to declare unconstitutional those fees which are 
higher than downstream damages. Up to this time, however, 
Vermont has not followed the New Hampshire test. In fact, 
there is language in a 1960 Vermont case indicating that the 
court would be reluctant to apply such a test, especially as re-
gards water pollution regulations: 
When supported by strongly favored policy considerations, legisla-
tion and orders will not be struck down as unreasonable solely be-
cause a financial hardship is necessarily worked on a particular in-
dividual, even to the point of being destructive of his business.41 
I t should be noted that this language is dicta and not holding, but 
the case does, nonetheless, strongly suggest that the court would 
be unlikely to follow a test as stringent as that adopted by New 
Hampshire. 
The second constitutional issue, and the more crucial one, is 
whether a provision imposing an effluent fee on persons not hold-
ing discharge permits is a valid exercise of the police power. For 
an exercise of the police power to be valid, three tests must be 
met: the legislative purpose must be proper, the regulations im-
posed must have a reasonable relation to that purpose, and the 
regulations must not be arbitrary or discriminatory. 
The test of "proper legislative purpose" would certainly seem 
to be met here. The United States Supreme Court has stated that 
protection of the health and safety of the people is a proper 
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purpose,42 and that the determination of aesthetic values is also a 
proper purpose.43 Water pollution control is clearly related to the 
people's health and safety, and to aesthetics as well. Providing 
an incentive to comply with water quality standards would then 
seem to be a logical step in achieving such proper purposes. 
The administrative regulations which stem from the statute 
must have a reasonable and substantial relation to the purpose 
of the statute;44 this is the second test for a valid exercise of the 
police power. It seems clear that of the various fee methods 
which could be utilized, the cost-of-treatment method is the least 
vulnerable to constitutional attack on these grounds. A fee struc-
ture which makes it economically desirable for the polluter to 
comply quickly with required treatment standards (thereby 
raising the water quality) is more likely to achieve the intended 
purpose than a fee structure which is computed on some other 
basis. 
Problems may arise under this second test. If the Board 
decides to use the downstream-damages method, it is not alto-
gether clear whether a reasonable and substantial relation to the 
purpose of the statute (raising water quality) would still exist. 
The Board as of this time has not adopted ei ther method and 
perhaps, as suggested earlier, the Board will opt for a method 
similar to the Czech system whereby both cost of treatment and 
downstream damages are taken into account when computing the 
fee. It is submitted that the legislature should amend §912(e) (2) 
to clarify the connection between the charge and the purpose of 
the statute.45 It would probably be wiser for the Board to seek 
legislative action rather than to simply rely on a charge struc-
ture which combined cost of treatment and downstream damages. 
While the court might determine that a dual fee method is con-
stitutional, a surer course would be to avoid the question and 
resul ting li tiga tion. 46 
Objection to the use of an effluent fee system may also be 
made on the ground that it is arbitrary or discriminatory. This 
test is crucial for Vermont, since there are a number of classifica-
tions which must be examined. For example, distinctions are 
drawn between persons who use the waters to dispose of wastes 
and persons who do not47 and between dischargers and polluters.48 
Still other distinctions are made among polluters themselves.49 
Because the statute does assess fees on certain people but not on 
others, the question then arises whether the statute is arbitrary 
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or discriminatory. However, classification, in and of itself, does not 
mean that the regulation is discriminatory in the constitutional 
sense of the word. Classifications are proper if they are reasonable, 
i.e., if they serve some necessary function in light of the statute's 
purpose and if all persons within a given class are treated alike. 
The problem thus becomes how one may know whether the 
regulations are arbitrary or discriminatory. There are a number 
of judicially developed standards by which to determine these 
issues: the classifications must be based on substantial distinc-
tions which suggest the propriety of substantially different 
legislation or regulation; the classifications must be germane to 
the purpose of the law; the law must apply equally to all mem-
bers of a given class; and finally the classifications must not pre-
clude the addition of other persons to already existing classes.5o 
The distinction which is reflected in the statute between per-
sons who do and who do not dispose of wastes meets the above 
standards. However, there are further distinctions which exist 
within the class "persons disposing of wastes." For example, 
those who use fertilizers are expressly distinguished from dis-
chargers and polluters,51 both of whom are discussed below. The 
fertilizer distinction is probably valid, since the need for regula-
tion is clearer for non-farming discharges. 52 
In another distinction, persons diposing of wastes are divided 
into dischargers and polluters.53 This distinction is based on two 
considerations: first, an examination maybe made of differences 
in quantity and quality of wastes, and, second, an examination 
may be made of differences in water hydrology, presence or 
absence of other discharges on the same watercourses, and pop-
ulation density. Distinctions based on the quantity and quality 
of discharge are probably constitutionally valid under the stan-
dards mentioned above. The two classes are based on substantial 
differences. The classification is germane to the law in question 
since only the person who discharges unacceptable quantities of 
wastes and/or discharges in an unacceptable manner is subject 
to the fees rrovision. The law applies equally to dischargers, as 
members 0 one class, and polluters, as members of a different 
class. And finally, the structure of these two classes does not 
preclude addition. Therefore, it would seem that the differentia-
tion between dischargers and polluters is neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory. 
A second method, which differentiates dischargers from pollu-
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ters by evaluating their disposals in terms of hydrology and pop-
ulation density, seems similarly valid. By consideration of these 
and similar factors it is possible to distinguish between persons 
who discharge equal amounts of waste. An occasion for such a 
distinction would arise when persons discharge waste into differ-
ent bodies of water. As discussed above, the propriety of discri-
minations based on such factors as hydrology and population 
density is to be determined by resort to judicial standards; the 
differences in such factors must be substantial. Since the purpose 
of the law is to raise water quality and since significantly different 
watercourses may require higher or lower standards to achieve 
the same level of purity, the law affects different areas differently. 
There is, however, equal treatment among all members of the 
same class. 
Finally, assuming the validity of the discharger-polluter dis-
tinction, it is necessary to decide whether the alternative fee 
methods are either arbitrary or discriminatory. Since the fee 
structure applies only to polluters, and since we have already 
determined that creation of a separate class of polluters may be 
proper and valid, we need now only concern ourselves with 
whether the fee methods would result in discriminatory treat-
ment within a given polluter class. In other words, it must be 
ascertained whether such polluters are treated alike, and whether 
the two methods are germane to the statute. 
Application of a cost-of-treatment method would result in 
uniform treatment among polluters because the effluent fees 
would be assessed aginst each polluter by the same standard, 
i.e., cost of treatment. Different polluters might ultimately pay 
different rates, but that would be immaterial. The test would be 
whether the fees were computed in the same manner for mem-
bers of the same class. 
Under a downstream-damages method, however, there would 
most definitely be different rates for different polluters since the 
damage done depends in part on factors such as the number of 
polluters in the area, the population density, and the different 
downstream uses of particular watercourses. Once again, how-
ever, the fact of different rates does not per se indicate that 
members of the same class are being treated differently. As long 
as the same standard is used (i.e., damage done downstream) 
for all members of the polluter class, they are receiving equal 
treatment under the statute. 
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Assuming then that members of the same class would be 
treated equally under either method, we must now consider 
whether each of the alternative methods is germane to the pur-
pose of the statute. 
As mentioned previously, the purpose of the statute is to raise 
the state's water quality. In accordance with this purpose, the 
fee system provides an economic incentive to comply with water 
quality standards. It would appear that a downstream-damages 
method is not directly related either to the statute's purpose or 
to its supporting fee system. Were the purpose of the statute and 
the fee system to establish equity between polluters and down-
stream users, this method would be appropriate. This, however, 
is not the case. Thus, in terms of relevance to the statute's pur-
pose, the best that can be said for the downstream-damages 
method is that it might provide an incentive to comply with 
water quality standards assuming that damages are greater than 
treatment cost, and that it might have a vague, indirect relation 
to raising water quality. It cannot, however, be said that the 
method is clearly suited to either purpose. Nonetheless, the 
statute makes mandatory an approximation of downstream dam-
ages in setting the fee schedule. As mentioned earlier, it would be 
advisable to seek legislative amendment of this section, but if 
amendment were not feasible, it would then be advisable to use 
the downstream damages as a basis for a surcharge (though not a 
basic charge). The use of a downstream-damages method to set 
the basic fee could result in a finding by the Vermont courts that 
the fee structure is arbitrary and discriminatory, not germane 
to the purpose of the statute, and therefore unconstitutional. 
The cost-of-treatment method, by contrast, would seem to be 
particularly well suited to the general purpose of the statute 
and to the purpose (economic incentive) of implementing a fee 
system. As such, it might reasonably be considered germane to 
the statute. Silus Robert Lyman, hqwever, takes a contrary posi-
tion in a detailed study for the University of Wisconsin Water 
Resources Center.54 Mr. Lyman argues that a fee system based 
on an annualized cost of treatment will reflect such variables as 
the financial status of the polluter, the nature of his business, 
and the age and condition of his plant, rather than the damage 
due to the watercourse. Therefore he maintains that the system 
would depend on arbitrary considerations and would not be 
germane to the purpose improvement of water quality. Conse-
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quently, the system would be discriminatory and unconstitu-
tiona1.66 
Mr. Peter Davis, however, General Attorney for the United 
States Department of Agriculture at the Wisconsin Water Re-
sources Center, strongly disagrees with Mr. Lyman. He states 
that Lyman's position rests on the assumption that the fees will 
be levied per unit of waste produced while in fact such fees are 
generally based on units of waste discharged. 56 
The Arthur D. Little Company (ADL) also takes a position 
contrary to Mr. Lyman's, but on grounds which differ from Mr. 
Davis'.fi1 Lyman argues that an annualized cost-of-treatment 
method is not relevant to the purpose of the statute and is, 
therefore, arbitrary, discriminatory, and unconstitutional. ADL 
argues, on the other hand, that an annualized cost-of-treatment 
method is relevant to the purpose of the fee system (economic in-
centive) and that the fee system, in turn, is relevant to the 
purpose of the statute as a whole. In other words, the cost-of-
treatment method motivates persons to comply with treatment 
standards; and then compliance or noncompliance directly af-
fects the state's water quality, whose improvement is intended 
by the statute. This two-step analysis by ADL seems more 
satisfactory than an examination which proceeds from the par-
ticular fee method directly to the general statutory purpose. 
There appears then to be no logical flaw in arguing that the cost-
of-treatment method is pertinent to the statute. 
B. Equity 
Under the cost-of-treatment method, an individualized charge 
is more equitable than a uniform charge which is based on a 
group average. The individualized charge recognizes differences 
between treaters, who already have incurred construction and 
operation costs, and non-treaters, who have not incurred any 
such costs. The non-treaters, of course, would pay the higher 
fees; their fees would approximate the costs of constructing and 
operating a treatment plant. There would also be greater equity 
among non-treaters (polluters) themselves, since an individual-
ized cost-of-treatment method would eliminate the possibility of 
a polluter's paying something other than his actual cost.58 It 
must be remembered, however, that while full equity is desirable, 
the more individualized programs may create great administra-
tive burdens. 
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While a cost-of-treatment method permits individualized, and 
thereby equitable, handling of treaters and non-treaters, it does 
not create equity as between non-treaters and downstream users 
of the watercourses. This shortcoming follows from the fact that 
the collected fees would not be used to compensate downstream 
users. Such compensation, were it the statutory goal, could be 
accomplished through a downstream-damages method. How-
ever, if such equity were the aim of a statute, there would then 
be no equity between treater and non-treater. In such a case, the 
administrative burden of evaluating damages and setting fees 
would be nearly impossible; moreover, the incentive purpose of 
the fee system would not be met. 
C. Administrative Feasibility 
The more general or standardized the charge structure, the 
easier the system will be to administer. But while administrative 
considerations are best served by a generalized fee, equity de-
mands a fee which is highly individualized. Thus, administra-
tive feasibility must be weighed against equity. 
Of the two methods which have been considered, the cost-of-
treatment method, whether individualized or generalized, would 
be easier to administer. This conclusion follows from an examina-
tion of the immense difficulties that arise in establishing a rate 
schedule based on downstream damages. To base a rate struc-
ture on downstream damages, the Board must first determine the 
monetary damages. There are two ways to determine such dam-
ages: to ascertain the costs incurred by downstream users to 
purify the polluted water, or to place values on the various down-
stream uses. Neither alternative, as we shall see below, is satis-
factory. 
There are two important objections to basing damages on 
downstream treatment costs. First, the method is based on un-
realistic assumptions. It assumes that all downstream users will 
treat the polluted water themselves and then continue to use it. 
It does not account for the possibility that some downstream in-
dividuals will simply forgo the use of such water altogether. It 
cannot seriously be argued, for example, that all families who 
have used a particular watercourse for boating and swimming 
are going to construct treatment facilities so that they may con-
tinue to enjoy the water. Many, if not most, simply will go else-
where. Yet under this method of assessing damages, their in-
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juries, (i.e. their being unable to use the water as before and, 
possibly, their incurring costs to go elsewhere) will not be re-
flected in the damage figures. The rate structure would reflect 
only damages to those persons who continue to use the water 
after first treating it themselves. A second objection to the 
downstream damages method is that the method may undermine 
the incentive goal of the entire fee system. It has been found, for 
example, that the cost of purifying water on intake for drinking 
purposes is substantially lower than the cost of purifying water 
on output at its source of pollution.59 This finding demonstrates a 
danger that fees based on downstream damages may be less 
than treatment costs, and thereby be useless as an incentive 
device. 
The second method of determining downstream damages is to 
place monetary values on actual and potential downstream uses. 
A value is placed, for example, on a day of boating by a given 
number of persons and a day of swimming by a given number of 
persons; then estimations are made of how many more people 
would use the watercourse were it cleaner. The difficulties in 
assigning values to such activities are enormous. Sheer arbitrari-
ness would seem inevitable in setting the number of persons who 
are affected and the amount of their damages. There simply 
seems to be no way to accurately assess damages to actual and 
potential downstream uses. 
Virtually any attempt to compute fees on the basis of down-
stream damages seems ultimately to be unsatisfactory. One 
would always have to discount the downstream damages which 
are attributable to dischargers and farmers. One would always 
have to determine the amount of damages caused by each of the 
various polluters on the watercourse. It would then always be 
necessary to allocate damages per unit of particular waste dis-
charged. The problem of allocating damages per unit of waste is 
exceedingly complex. Different wastes may have different effects 
on the same downstream use, and the same waste may have 
different effects on different downstream uses. For example, one 
waste may have a merely negligible effect on a downstream 
manufacturer's use of water, while a second waste may require 
him to treat his water intake extensively. A third waste may have 
a negligible effect on manufacturing but have a devastating effect 
on fishing and swimming. These conditions must be reflected in 
the fee. Differences in hydrology, in seasons, and in high and low 
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flow periods are but a few of the factors which must also be con-
sidered. Furthermore, it must be noted that much of the damage 
is likely to be cumulative. One unit of a waste, for example, might 
cause no perceptible damage at all, while a million units of the 
same waste might cause severe damage; thus there may be no 
precise relationship between unit of waste and unit of damage. 
Even in cases where the waste-damage relationship is well docu-
mented, there exist wide variations in tolerance.6o 
In summary, then, the administrative objections to a down-
stream damages method are these: (1) it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to measure damages; (2) the effects of each waste 
unit on each downstream use must be considered separately; 
(3) many of the downstream uses are social uses for which there 
is no market mechanism by which to determine their monetary 
values; and (4) the data necessary for an accurate rate structure 
based on downstream damages are not currently available and 
probably will not be available for some time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Of the two alternative fee methods considered herein, the cost-
of-treatment method is the more desirable. The downstream-
damages method is subject to three major criticisms which the 
cost-of-treatment method avoids. First, the downstream-damages 
method creates a heavy administrative burden; second, because 
it is extremely difficult to measure damages and relate them to 
particular polluters, such determinations will often be made 
arbitrarily and thereby raise questions of constitutionality; and 
third, a fee system based on downstream damages is not likely to 
provide a substantial incentive to comply with standards for the 
improvement of water quality. 
A major problem which now faces the Board is that the statute 
makes divergent demands: although, the primary purpose of the 
fee system is to motivate polluters to clean their discharges, the 
statute nonetheless specifically mandates a fee system which re-
flects an approximation of downstream damages. A downstream-
damages approach alone will not motivate polluters to treat their 
wastes, and it will also be constitutionally questionable. On the 
other hand, a cost-of-treatment approach alone will ignore the 
statutory requirement to approximate downstream damages. 
Since the Board has not yet decided which method to use, it is 
impossible to evaluate the operation of an effluent fee system in 
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Vermont. However, in light of the two statutory objectives and 
the assessment criteria discussed above, the following method is 
suggested. The Board should first seek legislative amendment of 
the statute in order to reconcile the divergence between the two 
provisions mentioned above. As the statute now reads, no method 
will satisfactorily meet both statutory requirements. In order to 
effect such a reconciliation, the following amendment is sug-
gested: "The Board shall establish a fee structure which operates 
primarily as an incentive for persons to comply with water 
quality standards. The Board shall furthermore have discre-
tionary authority to compute a surcharge based on an approxima-
tion of damages to actual or potential downstream users." Such 
an amendment would supply sufficient flexibility for the Board 
to choose between two alternatives: a simple cost-of-treatment 
method, or a method, similar to that of the Czechs', wherein the 
basic charge is determined by a cost-of-treatment method and a 
surcharge is determined by downstream damages. Both alterna-
tives would be safe from constitutional attack. 
The optimum effiuent fee method would seem to be a cost-of-
treatment method which is refined by a "specific activity" ap-
proach and an option for the polluter; these refinements are dis-
cussed below. Such a method would, of course, have to be con-
sistent with the general purpose of the statute and would also 
have to be constitutionally sound. Presuming that such were the 
case, the method would then have to be evaluated in terms of 
administrative feasibility and equity. 
A cost-of-treatment method having a "specific activity" ap-
proach coupled with an option for the polluter would be rela-
tively simple to administer and yet would be basically equitable. 
Such a method would first involve setting generalized average 
fees for each of the many different industrial activities; it would 
take into account the fact that treatment costs vary from in-
dustry to industry. Since it would not involve the details re-
quired by an individualized approach, it would have an ad-
vantage in administrative simplicity. At the same time, it would 
be considerably more equitable than a generalized fee structure, 
which would not make any distinctions among different industrial 
uses and which would be more likely to impose a fee that is far 
removed from actual treatment cost. 
The option for the polluter would arise as follows. The op-
timum fee would be set higher than the average cost of treat-
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ment within a particular industry. The polluter would, however, 
be permitted to submit plans for the construction of treatment 
facilities, together with verified engineering estimates of construc-
tion and operation costs. These being submitted, the polluter 
would then be given the option to pay either a semi-generalized 
fee or a fee based on is engineering estimates. Such an option 
arrangement would approach the nearly ideal equity which char-
acterizes an individualized cost-of-treatment method, but it 
would avoid the administrative difficulties that arise in setting 
individualized fees. It would, furthermore, impose on the polluter 
a heavier burden to protect the quality of waters. It seems 
fundamentally fair that the producer of pollution should be 
required to finance corrective action. Moreover, placement of 
such an onus as the polluter would significantly reduce the 
amount of administrative initiatives which otherwise would have 
to be taken by the Board. It should be noted that if the general-
ized fee were substantially higher than the actual cost of treat-
ment, the polluter would have an added incentive to begin 
construction quickly. 
If the Board wished to establish greater equity between pollu-
ters and downstream users, it could impose on polluters a sur-
charge based on downstream damages. Yet were the Board to do 
so, it would thereby increase its administrative workload. Such 
a surcharge, however, would not seem to be necessary, since the 
method outlined above would spur vigorous efforts by polluters 
to clean up their wastes, and since these efforts themselves should 
benefit downstream users . 
............. ~.-<-.... 
POSTSCRIPT 
Since completion of this article, the Department and Board 
have promulgated tentative regulations and a fee structure based 
on annualized cost-of-treatment figures. The Board realized at 
the time that such a fee structure would not reflect downstream 
damages, but felt nevertheless that this was the only course left 
open to it given the incentive purpose of the fee system, and 
given the administrative realities-the same basic reasons for the 
author's favoring a fee based on cost of treatment. An opinion of 
the Attorney General requested by the Board stated, however, 
that given the wording of the statute such a fee would be un con-
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stitutional. Consequently, the legislature has postponed the effec-
tive date of the effluent fees section until July of 1972 in order 
that either the statutory wording may be changed to fit the 
proposed fee or a more acceptable fee method may be devised to 
satisfy the existing language of the statute. It is impossible to 
suggest at this early date what the eventual outcome will be. 
The author spoke to Mr. Willard Farnum, Permit Administra-
tor in the Department of Water Resources. He offered his own 
personal opinion, which is not necessarily the view of the De-
partment, that the legislature is likely to delete the entire effluent 
fees section from the statute. He bases this opinion on the political 
pressures being brought by the business community. 
We feel that such a deletion would eviscerate the statute. With 
the effluent fees provision, Vermont remains in the vanguard of 
responsible and imaginative environmental control; without the 
effluent fees provisions, Vermont is merely one of many states 
with weak water quality control programs. To delete the effluent 
fees provision would bring an unfortunate end to what would 
have been a courageous and highly significant piece of legislation 
and would be a vast disservice to the citizenry of Vermont . 
.. +.~>.-<---.+-
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